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This paper aims to provide a functional assessment of a country’s dynamics at a regional power level, 
through the development of a tool which shall examine the working hypothesis of a given country’s 
“candidacy” to emerge as a regional power. The power equation applied in order to have such an 
evaluation has been formulated in a visually enriched and prototype format, given that particularly the 
geopolitics activate systems of interactions dynamically changing into many dimensions. The scope also 
includes the criteria verifying the achievement of the regional powers’ objectives as well as the review of 
future relevant prospects through a SWOT (strengths-weaknesses-opportunities-threats) analysis in a 
specific spatial and temporal context. Contemporary Turkey shall be taken as an example of this 
application and, therefore, while enumerating the assessment criteria, it will be briefly examined whether 
Turkey meets the conditions under discussion. This country has been selected on the grounds that its 
intentions have been overtly declared and its efforts are underway. The study consequently emphasises 
on the policy implications of the dilemmatic question if the on-going Turkish regime transformation may 
be or keep being a pilot for other states’ progress in the heavily turmoiled Middle Eastern area. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In international politics, concentrations of power have been given, at times, several descriptions, 
“superpower” being prominent, namely a state capable of wielding power and influence at a global 
level, as introduced in an analysis by W.T.R. Fox and N. Spykman during the 1940’s - at the dawn 
of the then forthcoming post-war new order of things - but also, some decades earlier, by F. Ratzel 
who was prompted by the super power (Weltmacht) enjoyed by any certain country mainly through 
its maritime power (Waibl; Herdina, 1998).  
Power is a significant attribute in the behaviours of countries that largely determines 
international relations. It should be underlined that power is defined in the context of certain 
circumstances and some of its aspects can be measured and, therefore, categorised on the basis 
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of the degree to which a certain country is able to persuade, influence and/or even coerce other 
countries into complying with its wishes or otherwise suffer consequences and/or penalties should 
they refuse (Zagorin, 2006). An important “variation” of the meaning of superpower is “regional 
power”, namely a powerful state whose capabilities, however, in wielding power and influence are 
geographically limited. Studies on such a political phenomenon have produced certain theoretical 
listings of the characteristics identified in principle in regional powers over numerous historical 
instances. For example, according to the European Consortium for Political Research (University of 
Oxford, 2008), an inherent characteristic of a regional power is the hegemonic influence, in 
economic and military terms, exercised in a geographically defined region whose peoples 
recognise, accept or, at least, tolerate such an influence. 
This study, however, aims to provide a more practical assessment of a country’s dynamics at 
regional power level, through the development of a tool which shall examine the working hypothesis 
of a given country’s “candidacy” to emerge as a regional power. The scope also includes the criteria 
verifying the achievement of its target and the review of its future prospects through a SWOT 
(strengths-weaknesses-opportunities-threats) analysis in a specific spatio-temporal context. 
Contemporary Turkey shall be taken as an example of such application and, therefore, while 
enumerating the assessment criteria, we shall be briefly examining whether Turkey meets the 
conditions under discussion. This country has been selected on the grounds that its intentions have 
been overtly declared and its efforts are underway.  
According to a speech made by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs and incumbent Prime 
Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu, who has the “trademark theory” of the so-called Strategic Depth 
(Statejik Derinlik): “… Turkish foreign policy is driven by three basic principles: a) a vision guiding its 
course, b) a no crisis-oriented attitude taking measures before crises emerge, and ultimately c) an 
integration course through systematic deployment on more than one axes…” (Karabat, 2010)). 
Also, according to one of his previous interviews: “… The region belongs to us. This is our home … 
We should take our destiny into our own hands, and for this we need full cooperation and regional 
integration. The foundation for it is in our history and geography … we shall combine our assets to 
get back the golden era in the region, which produced so many of the world’s important civilisations 
…” (Karabat, 2010). 
 
2. Methodology: A New Form of Power Equation 
 
The multi-level and complex issue of gaining or losing power is usually described by means of a 
polynomial. It is a useful method in so much as it condenses a series of thoughts under a brief and 
systematic formula which, on the one hand, can be easily communicated and, on the other, it 
demonstrates the variability of the solution. The causal variables are numerous, the criteria and the 
respective measurements varied. In the issue under consideration and in the Turkey case study, its 
prior Prime Minister himself, A. Davutoğlu (Davutoğlu, 2014), proposes such an equation in his 
book, namely: 
P = {(Hi + G + Po + Cu) + (EC + TC + MC)}. * {SM + SP + PW} 
whereas the acronyms are translated and explained as follows: 
Hi: History, G: Geography, Po: Population, Cu: Culture, EC: Economic Capacity, TC: 
Technological Capacity, MC: Military Capacity, SM: Strategic Mentality, SP: Strategic Planning, 
PW: Political Will  
The power equation can be originally reformulated in a visually enriched format of analysis 
which is more appropriate to demonstrate that such an equation is a system of interactions 
dynamically changing into many dimensions. On the basis of the linear formulas, the polynomials 
are shown on one dimension, but the political realities derived from power projections are multi-
dimensional and subject to a high degree of sensitivity, given that the power factors interact in a 
manner similar to the rotation of the “Rubik’s Cube” sides and edges: 
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Fig. 1. The 3d power equation is a system of interactions dynamically changing over multiple 
dimensions (Source: author self – work based on (Williams, 2010) and (Stoiciu, 2010)) 
 
In a first theoretical description of the above presented figure (Fig. 2), the five components/power 
criteria at the front side of the cube are the means and/or the short-term objectives: 
1. Energy and economic growth 
2. Defence industry – strategic armaments 
3. Critical geographical position – strategically envisioned leadership 
4. Favourable international relations – multi-faceted diplomacy 
5. Social cohesion – soft powers – hegemonic mythology,  
which interact with the three long-term objectives/strategic power indicators on the top 
cube’s surfaces: 
Ι. Geopolitics power projection – ΙΙ. Human development and macro-economics indices – 
ΙΙΙ. Energy efficiency, geoenergy power projection  
on the four geographical fields of operations as they appear on the third dimension at the 
side of the cube:  
i. National – ii. Regional – iii. Continental – iv. Global,  
in order to configure, on the basis of the probable rotations of the cube sides around the 
3d axes, hundreds of statistically possible power projection pathways, which are indicative 
of the complexity and the multiple factors involved in the achievement and sustenance of 
the major objective of acquiring and keeping power. It is worthy to highlight that a Rubik 
cube may 43.252.003.274.489.856 possible combinations (Stoiciu, 2010)! 
 
3. The Criteria of a Regional Power’s Emerge 
 
On the basis of possible rotations of the faces around the alternative axes, dozens of statistically 
possible paths are shaped, indicative of the complex and multi-factorial requirements in achieving 
and maintaining specific objectives, we may proceed into the discussion of the major criteria that 
qualify countries as regional powers. This is possible because of the analogy between the country 
states, which motivate their societies towards the well-being of their people, with the majority of 
public and private sector organizations whose purpose is also to accomplice certain missions 
motivating their members, stakeholders and resources. In this context, leaders and managers are 
expected to wisely deal with the knowledge of where their organizations head to and how they get 
there; the wisdom itself is not related to any superficial skills but to the knowledge management, the 
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configuration of processes and procedures supporting to the objectives’ achievement, the 
contingency planning, and most of all to the moderate mind-set required for effective crisis 
management. The risk analysis by definition involves forecasting, feedback, updating and worst 
case scenario development, given that any risk is no other than the probability of adversary to our 
objectives events to take place. The success of the leaders is directly interconnected to the extent 
they are capable of identifying, analysing and assessing risks, executing respective mitigation 
actions and follow up controls.      
 
3.1 The 1st criterion: Energy sufficiency 
 
It is taken for granted that superpowers consume exceptionally large energy resources and, 
consequently, shape their strategies and policies, in general, with a view to ensuring sustainably 
high availability in energy resources. Likewise, regional powers, although they manage smaller 
energy quantities, tend to play an active role in the energy issues of their broader region, in fact 
“dominating” the production or, alternatively, the supply of valuable energy resources. 
By applying this specific criterion in the case of Turkey, it can be easily assessed that this 
country systematically pursues its objective to become a leading actor in the so-called energy 
diplomacy. Many analysts, in the scope of adopting a respective geo-energy approach (Vidakis, 
2015) have identified besides the traditional geopolitical considerations an abundance of 
geoenergy-related examples in Turkey’s respective policies (Energy security and Greece, 2009). 
Since the R.T. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) took over the government in 2002, 
Turkey has been energetically pursuing to become a highly crucial energy hub for the European 
and American imports as well as for Russian exports. It has focused its efforts on playing a 
politically and technically decisive role in the various projects for the construction and operation of 
an extended network of gas and oil pipelines (Asche, 2016). 
In a similar way, Turkey is also an energy hub for the Middle East since it provides an 
overland route for the transport of large quantities of the Iranian natural gas, while at the same time 
it manages the significant water resources of the rivers Tiger and Euphrates, which are a major 
energy source of the Iraqi and Syrian economies. On the domestic front, during the first terms of the 
AKP government, major development programmes have been initiated and implemented as well as 





Fig. 2. Turkish planning on gas and oil pipelines’ networking (source: Vidakis; Baltos, 2015) 
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The first decade of AKP governments signalled an ambitious, robust and well-structured national 
and international energy policy. The latest updates though, referring to the last five years have 
indicated fatigue in the execution of the original planning, identified over projects cancellation and 
energy security issues prevailing. In the Oil Pipelines front, Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline (Iraq-Turkey, 
970 km-long twin pipeline system ferrying the quarter of Iraq's crude exports). It has been damaged 
since the first Gulf War, leaving a capacity of just 500,000 b/d, while it is being repeatedly targeted 
by terrorists. In 2013, it faced 54 separate attacks, reducing the average throughput to the half. In 
early 2014 Northern Iraq completed a pipeline connecting its oil fields to the Kirkuk-Ceyhan 
pipeline. The pipeline is independent of Iraqi government oversight, has a capacity of over 400,000 
b/d, while further pumping upgrades are expected to almost double the flow capacity. Additionally, 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline, originating in Azerbaijan, with a length of 1,760 km and capacity 
of around 1mn barrels per day, keeps transporting since 2006 the Caspian crude via Georgia to 
Turkey (BMI Research, 2017). 
On the other front of the Gas Pipelines, the Blue Stream, since 2007 at a capacity of 16.0bcm, 
connects the Russian gas transit system to Samsun in Turkey, crossing the Black Sea and running 
on a joint venture between Gazprom and Eni. Strong demand in Turkey has driven to negotiations 
for the pipeline expansion. The Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) will then take the Shah Deniz 
Phase II gas from Azerbaijan via Turkey onto Europe. The construction started in 2015 towards 
estimated works delivery in 2018, winning out over other proposals, like the Nabucco pipeline that 
was initially supported by the U.S. and the EU. On the other hand, the 900 km South Stream gas 
pipeline, designed to carry up gas from Russia, through the Black Sea, to Bulgaria, Greece, 
Hungary, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia and Austria has been cancelled, since Gazprom was unable to 
realise the project in accordance with EU law.  
Last but not least, since October 2016, Russia and Turkey have agreed on the construction of 
the Turkish Stream pipeline, with a delivery date around 2019. As of May 2017, the construction of 
the subsea pipeline has begun close to the Russian coast, there is though scepticism as to the size 
and effectiveness of this project in regard with the sufficiency of the existing infrastructure and/or 
the weak demand for gas in Europe.  
The Turkish relevant strategy, although it is based completely on transportation rather than 
production of energy presents strengths and opportunities (Karkazis., Vidakis., Baltos, 2013) 
however, given the unstable political, internal and external environment, weaknesses and threats 
stem out of the limited operational freedom the cost disadvantages, the volatility of national and 
international energy policies, jeopardizing the sustainability of the Turkish energy prospective. It is 
indicative of the vulnerability afore-mentioned that following the collapse in oil prices in 2014, 
instead of reducing the fuel taxes that make up the bulk of the retail consumer basket, the 
government accused petroleum distributors of “profiteering”, imposing profit caps which operators 
complained made it impossible to operate at a profit (Wigen 2012). As a result, Turkey's fifth-largest 
distributor, Total, sold up and left in 2015 (OxResearch Daily Brief Service, 2017). 
 
3.2 The 2nd criterion: Economic growth 
 
It is also self-evident that regional powers should be economically robust in proportion to the 
standards of their region. No country can emerge as a “regional leader” if it is drowning in 
uncontrollable debts and financial deficits. Almost all of the other criteria/prerequisites for the 
emergence of a regional power, in any part of the world, entail respective financial resources. It is 
also true that a flourishing economy, by itself, does not provide sufficient basis to this end. Such 
economy should be maintained on a continuous upward trend of growth and progress. 
If we turn our attention to Turkey’s economic situation and relevant prospects during the first 
decade of AKP governance, we notice that the so called “neo-ottoman” governance had 
implemented radical changes, in terms of quality and quantity, insofar as the markets are 
concerned (Kinoğlu, 2014) pages 12-18. It is standard practice to refer to the so-called Anatolian 
Tigers, an elite of entrepreneurs affiliated to the governing party spreading not only in large cities 
but also into the depths of Anatolia, whose names increasingly occupy positions in the Forbes’ 
multi-millionaire lists, having lead Turkey to join the G-20 at frenzied growth rates with a relative 
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stability, despite the undergoing crisis in the international economic environment. More and more 
“Made In “Turkey” products are exported to the international markets; not only the traditional textiles 
but also complex equipment and devices which require specialised labour in terms of production 
and industry. Furthermore, Turkey’s economic penetration in the other Muslim countries had been 
unprecedented, particularly with respect to the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Turkey’s success in attracting outside investment peaked in 2007; since then it has been 
failing to match its peers and keep long-term and high levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). On 
the opposite, over the last years numerable high-profile investors have started leaving operations. 
In the context of growing worries connected with threats of companies’ and assets’ seizures under 
the government’s anti-Western rhetoric as well as the excuse that owners and executives have 
been alleged to be related with the failed coup of July 2016, the FDI rises but slowly. Given the 
regional insecurity, the immense concentration of power under the president’s control, combined 
with the “draconian” reaction to the coup attempt, it seems the past investment levels are likely out 
of reach over the next months. It depends on the duration of the political instability whether 
international investors stay or cut their (Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2017). 
The financial analysts expect that the failed coup, the aggressive government's crackdown on 
the opposition, along with the recent security risks from terrorist attacks have blurred the country’s 
global economic outlook towards negative medium-term economic results. The real GDP growth 
was in 2015 upwardly revised to 5.9%, due to methodological adjustments on the national 
accounts, but then it was revised down from 3% to 2.2% in 2016 and an estimated 2.6% in 2017. It 
is assessed that a gradual stabilisation of internal political situation over 2018-21 will drive to real 
GDP growth of average 3.7% per year. Nowadays, the possibility of a serious disruption to capital 





Fig. 3. Sources of capital investment in Turkey (2012 - 2016) (Source: OxResearch Daily Brief 
Service, 2017) 
 
3.3 The 3rd criterion: Strategic armaments and Defence Industry 
 
Military power is the main lever for regional recognition. This is not directly related to aggressive or 
imperialistic behaviours. The mere existence and availability of military capacities are taken 
additionally into account in favour of a country towards peacekeeping and stability. Should 
circumstances arise, in the course of time, that demand high efficiency and effectiveness, it stands 
to reason that such a country may achieve further positive results. Nevertheless, in the case of a 
regional power, military equipment and its subsequent management should have specific “quality” 
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features indicative of a special dynamic influence in the surrounding geopolitical and geostrategic 
scene. Such armaments should have enhanced “range” and surpass the standard conventional 
numbers existing in neighbouring countries. 
If, for instance, Turkey seeks - and it is indubitably working towards this goal - to emerge as a 
regional power with increased control in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean affairs, 
numerous armed forces, aircrafts and frigates are no longer sufficient, as the case was in the past 
decades. On the contrary, current requirements urge for force multipliers, state-owned satellites, 
infrastructures for exploiting nuclear power, smart weapons such as unmanned and surveillance 
aircrafts, stealth technologies, aerial refuelling capabilities, cyber warfare, air-carriers, partnerships 
with pioneering manufacturers and, primarily, a domestic defence industry which ensures a high 
degree of independence in the political and military decision-making process. The above brief 
reference to strategic force multipliers is, at the same time, a listing of those that Turkey is 
systematically and gradually trying to have completely implemented by the dawn of the next 
decade. It is the precise answer to the rhetorical question asked in the beginning of this paragraph 
with respect to the steps that Turkey should take in its armaments sector, if it aspires to become in 
the long run a regional leader in the Eastern Mediterranean basin (Pamuk., Gurses, 2016). 
In line with the above, Turkey has reached the world's 14th top military spending position in 
2013 from the 16th place in 2012, according to April 2014 data published by SIPRI. Turkey's 
military expenditure was of $19.1 billion for 2013 (2.3% of GDP. The increase in the long run, 
between 2004 and 2013, was of 13% in real terms. It should also be taken into consideration that 
Turkey has been met with new security problems, particularly those related with the civil war in 
Syria (BBC Monitoring European, 2014). 
Apart from the fact that the Turkish army is the NATO's second biggest, it also launches plenty 
of indigenous weapons programs, including missiles, battle tanks and vehicles, a fighter jet, 
corvettes and frigates, helicopters, satellites, and drones. However, the 15 of July 2016 attempted 
coup reconsidered the military planning and programming in terms of human capital, given that 
more than 8,000 officers, including almost half of the generals and the admirals in the Turkish 
military's ranks, were discharged, weakening consequently the command structure from the top to 
the bottom. The government transferred military industries under civilian authority.  
In an environment of several asymmetrical wars, terrorist attacks and long-lasting militarily 
engagement in Syria crisis, numerable military training units were shut down. Just after the coup 
attempt, the government issued an executive decree almost evacuating the traditional military 
academies. They are being replaced by new academies operated by universities while the Defense 
Ministry establishes a strict oversight of their programs and activities. In a highly symbolic way, 
female and non-commissioned officers have been allowed to wear Islamic headscarves in the 
armed forces, while thousands of senior officers have been detained on the accusation that they 
are keeping ties with Fethullah Gülen, who, despite that he had been a spiritual and respectful 
mentor for R.T. Erdogan and his political movement far away in the past, was according to the 
government the master mind behind the preparation and execution of the 2016 coup attempt. On 
the other hand, the latter Turkish Imam himself, denies any involvement and declares himself as a 
victim of political conspiracy (Grove, 2017). 
The severity of the internal security problems created by the failed coup attempt in 2016 may 
have tremendous impact not only on the current Turkey's political direction but also on the fighting 
morale and capabilities. It has already caused a major trouble for NATO and western allies due to 
the purging of thousands of Turkish officers, giving the impression that Turkey is sliding away from 
democracy and rapidly damaging relations with allies such as Germany (CBRN Assessment, 2017). 
At the background of the actions that compile the socio-political surface of the current state of 
emergency, it is already proven that Turkey's military has been of the most politicized institutions. It 
has represented the secular elite for decades, it repeatedly overthrew elected governments and 
fiercely opposed the religious political parties like R.T. Erdogan's AKP. However, the July 2016 
military putschists not only demonstrated operational ineffectiveness towards their irregular way of 
pursuing political power but also failed in projecting legitimacy and social recognition. The fact that 
AKP in the aftermath of the failed coup constructed and disseminated an authoritative as well as 
heroic "narrative of the July 15 resistance", enabled the government to perform deep institutional 
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changes that will configure a new order in the cultural, economic, and socio-political domains of 
Turkish state (Altinordu, 2017). 
 
3.4 The 4th criterion: Geopolitically critical position 
 
Quite a few countries may carry the attributes of a regional power, remaining though at the margin 
of geopolitics if not at the margin of geography itself. Since politics are relative and subject to 
changes, no one is in a position to know where the history’s spotlights will focus on over the 
forthcoming decades. Let us consider, for instance, the time when the exploitation and distribution 
of wealth on the earth’s poles will commence; the time when, as a consequence, the countries 
bordering the Arctic and the Antarctica will play a leading part, no matter if they are eager to get 
involved, in vigorous redeployments with respect to taking over the title of superpowers and 
regional powers. 
For the time being, however, the “known” world of western history, the centuries-old Europe 
and, further afield, the “blazing” Middle East are, to their peoples’ blessing or discontent, some of 
the “iron threshing floors” at the edges of which forces and underlying leadership aspirations are 
thronged and crushed. This is where “the soil is drenched in blood and bears witness to biblical 
conflicts”, both just and unjust, while people’s collective memory has registered dreadful disasters 
and liberating visions in the dynamic wake of history. Given the relevant opportunities, those who 
possess maritime passages, points of access to energy treasures and traditional crossroads of 
nations, are virtually “driven” to contemplate and envision a place in the pantheon of the regional, to 
say the least, and international political powers (Bekdil, 2017). 
There is no doubt that, in terms of geography and geopolitics, Turkey is uniquely placed, as 
described above with a dash of surrealism, which is justifiable to a certain extent given the political 
importance and the history of the strip of land connecting Europe with Asia and Africa. The same 
geo-cultural area is the cradle of great nations and civilisations. The United States, as the most 
significant super power on the planet, often appear to recognise Turkey as a key-country for the 
control of the political and military situation on the Middle East scene, but also as a bulwark to a 
potential expansion of Russian control over the Eastern Mediterranean for many decades and 
irrespective of the socio-political changes in Russia (Reuters stuff, 2016). 
 
3.5 The 5th criterion: Leaders with mastery of powers 
 
Modern Turkey has been governed for almost two decades by leaders alternating roles but always 
under the political Islam orientation: A. Gül, R. T. Erdogan, B. Arinç, A. Davutoğlu, etc. have certain 
particularly noteworthy leadership characteristics. For the purpose of this analysis, it would suffice 
to mention that the former prime minister has worked his way up to the office of president while the 
minister of foreign affairs has become prime minister. In addition, the former minister of foreign 
affairs was previously the main advisor to the prime minister in creating a modern international 
policy, the president was minister of foreign affairs, the prime minister with the deputy prime 
minister founded the governing party (AKP, Justice and Development Party), while all of them were 
not only displaying common party origins but were also sharing a leader’s profile which is obviously 
nurtured by the vision of a powerful Turkey and, also, a vision of political ethics driven by political 
Islam and distant to the old times kemalists’ militaristic and elitist practices. 
Ten years ago, who could have even remotely contemplated that, in Turkey, about three 
hundred senior military officers would have been arrested in the fight against the “Ergenekon” 
organisation and the “Sledgehammer” (Balyoz)” operation without destabilising the political and 
social balance, and the party’s balance… And yet it happened, which means that the so-called 
Islamic leading group, “the neo-Ottoman leadership” mentioned earlier, has deep and broad 
popular support but, at the same time, it has closed ranks with middle-class administrative 
mechanisms which bring intentions to fruition and fight for the making and execution of decisions in 
a particularly adverse environment politically undermined by competing kemalist coalitions. Such a 
feat cannot be achieved without inspired and determined leaders that assiduously mastermind the 
necessary plans in order to implement them step by step (Esayan, 2013).  
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3.6 The 6th criterion: Favourable international relations 
 
Although regional powers have been described above as small-scale replicas of the superpowers, 
this comparison, albeit helpful to understand attitudes and behaviours, is not entirely valid. One of 
the obvious differences between regional powers and superpowers is that the former are 
dependent on the latter far more than the latter depend on the former. From another perspective, 
regional powers should not, at least, raise problems to the superpowers in the execution of their 
plans. Ideally for both, regional powers should develop policies and strategies in line with the 
objectives of the superpowers in every region and worldwide (Pipes, 2017). 
In Turkey’s case, the path to its establishment as a regional power is conditional upon the 
consent of the United States and Russia. It further depends on Turkey’s strategic choices which will 
convince the superpowers that their “ally” will protect their interests accordingly. The hypothesis 
that Turkey meets this specific criterion calls for careful and thorough consideration because both 
the interests and policies of the “Great Powers” are often unclear, relative, changeable and 
competing, while there may be unforeseen surprises which history holds in store for all nations on 
earth, irrespective of their size and their rationally estimated capacities. 
It is, however, certain that the international environment, and especially during the 2000s, was 
in general lines favourable for Turkey. One of the main requirements of the then Obama’s first 
administration was that Turkey would actively strive to project a more secular, moderate and pro-
western profile of political Islam in the Middle East. It was an ambitious experiment in order to 
disengage the West from the ghost of Islamic fundamentalism by winning “the hearts and thoughts” 
of the Muslims in the wider region. On the other front, Putin’s Russia chose Turkey as its strategic 
partner in geo-energy matters and thus succeeded, even indirectly, in realising its centuries-old 
aspiration to have a gate open to the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Taken into consideration that the currently most wanted political enemy of the government in 
Turkey, Fetulah Gülen, has found resort on U.S. territory, the AKP government keeps the U.S.-
Turkey relationship in tension by continuously challenging the White House for the F. Gülen’s 
immediate extradition. The two traditional NATO allies have also been diverged widely in regard 
with the role and support of the Syrian Kurds, whom Ankara considers terrorists, while Washington 
appreciates in several ways their ground operations’ effectiveness against the Islamic State. R.T. 
Erdogan’s even claimed that a lot of U.S. official statements criticising the Turkish government’s 
stance in the aftermath of the coup were indicators (Daily Herald, 2016) that western politicians, 
academics and journalists were somehow siding with the coup plotters (Daily News - Leading News 
Source for Turkey and the Region, 2017). 
In the same page, Turkish Defence Minister Fikri Isik highlighted that NATO should sit down 
and think where it went wrong in response to the coup attempt (Daily News - Leading News Source 
for Turkey and the Region, 2017). Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ stated that U.S. would be 
sacrificing its alliance with Ankara to "a terrorist" [Gülen] if it were to refuse to extradite him (Daily 
Herald, 2016). Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu even threatened that Turkey might look outside 
NATO for defence cooperation (Zorthian, 2016). Turkey kept normalizing its multi-level ties with 
Russia, implying against NATO that it may change direction. R.T. Erdogan apologized to President 
Vladimir Putin for shooting down a Russian military aircraft in November 2015 (Yinanç, 2017). Putin 
afterwards recalled his economic sanctions and travel bans against Turkey, and recovered all 
government-to-government relations (Jamieson, 2016)). The developments please not only V. Putin 
but also Tehran, his partner in the Syrian civil war, and puts Ankara on an ironic trade off by siding 
the Russian-Iranian Assad’s coalition with whom Turkey suffered an almost five year-old hostile 
relationship and conflict.  
A strategic axis of responses to the failed coup was the further weakening of Turkey's links 
with the West (Bekdil, 2017). The latter calls on Ankara to respect the “rule of law” and democracy, 
but instead, R.T. Erdogan declares intentions to reinstate the death penalty, making rhetorical 
questions like "Why should I keep them [the mutineers] and feed them in prisons for years to 
come?" (Pamuk., Gurses, 2016)) On the other side, Federica Mogherini, the European Union's 
foreign policy chief, answered that the re-introduction of the death penalty, would cancel any 
Turkey’s option to ever enter EU (Daily News - Leading News Source for Turkey and the Region, 
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2017). German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmaier characteristically added that because of 
the mass arrests and sweeping purges the two countries are like "emissaries from two different 
planets." (Reuters, 2016).  
 
3.7 The 7th criterion: Social Cohesion 
 
A first approach to regional powers as geopolitical phenomena places emphasis on the 
international diplomacy scene.  However, there is also the national dimension to be taken into 
account, namely all that happens on the domestic front, within each regional power’s society.  In 
such a context, the critical factor for gaining state control, which will also reflect in the country’s 
international relations, is the internal political cohesion, expressed in national, social and other axes 
of the institutional life. If a country seeks to play a catalytic role in its neighbours’ problems, it must 
ensure that its internal problems have been solved and the actual or potential instability hotbeds 
affecting its citizens’ daily lives have been eliminated.  How could it convince of its capability of 
dealing not only with its own external rivals but also with those of other countries, if it cannot deal 
effectively with its internal enemies? 
Insofar as Turkey is concerned, fulfilling the above criterion appears to be particularly difficult.  
More than 15% of its population consists of the Kurdish ethnic minority with which the official state 
has been in continuous and multi-form conflict for decades (Central Intelligence Agency, 2017). The 
Kurds’ resistance to the restriction of their ethnic and political rights is a time-bomb threatening 
Turkey’s political edifice.  In any case, the mere existence of the Kurdish matter constitutes not only 
a critical destabilising factor but, potentially, a means of pressure to be used by the superpowers in 
order to control future developments in the region. 
At a state level, the rift between the incumbent government and the opposition is not limited to 
the narrow context of power struggle between political parties.  Turkey is constantly undergoing a 
political revolution with leading actors the institutions themselves, the political parties, the armed 
forces, the justice system, the universities, the press, financial and religious players, etc. It is the 
majority of this specific society’s gravity centres which are themselves in conflict with each other 
given that they have taken sides either with the neo-ottomanism or kemalism proponents. 
These two constitutional ideologies reflect, as a whole, the different approach to the national 
structure and administration of the state, while they are painstakingly trying to close ranks with 
individual decision-making centres across the entire spectrum of Turkish society.  Thus, it can be 
assessed that, traditionally from the establishment of the Turkish Rebublic till the dawn of this 
century, the armed forces, higher education, the justice system and business entrepreneurs have 
taken the Kemalist line but, currently, the neo-Ottomans have sided not only with the government 
but also with the security forces, the religious centres, the masses of ordinary citizens and 
important business centres of the country (Kinoğlu, 2014). However, the latest constitutional 
revision on the roles of the army and justice is another ongoing situation representative of the 
conflict among Turkish institutions, and it has taken such extent that it is close to giving rise to 
potential violent reversals with unforeseeable consequences for the political and social cohesion of 
the country. 
In the context of the newly established Turkish presidential system, the prime minister 
“disappears” while the president holds vast power over the other powers, namely the parliament, 
the judiciary, as well as the budget and the military (Ege, 2016). The political emphasis on imbuing 
the presidency with complete socio-political control was for decades a top priority for the political 
Islam agenda in Turkey, as it has been also promoted by N. Erbakan and other leaders of the 
Islamic parties since the 70’s (Al-Arian, 2017). However, the current surrounding social environment 
is full of severe conflicts and turmoil. In the name of the imperative for a strong presidency, the 
referendum procedures have been criticised as non-transparent, near-civil war has started with the 
Kurds, while a crisis with Europe is being continually provoked. R.T. Erdogan cracked down on 
Gülen's followers, leading to approximately 47,000 arrests, 113,000 detainments, 135,000 firings or 
suspensions from jobs, etc (Başaran, 2017). The cautiousness and admirable efficiency with which 
R.T Erdogan became prime minister in 2003 and governed for eight years, achieving remarkable 
economic growth, containing the military leadership’s abusive overpowers and pursuing a policy of 
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"zero problems with neighbours", since 2011, has been vaporised (Pipes, 2017). 
 
4. Comparative and  SWOT Analysis - Policy Implications 
 
In a SWOT analysis a basic distinction is made, on the one hand, between strengths and 
weaknesses which are identified in the internal environment of the entity assessed and, on the 
other hand, between the opportunities and threats which reflect the entity’s external environment 
(Pahl and Richter 2009) . More specifically, with respect to Turkey’s internal strengths on the path 
to emerge as a regional power, during the AKP ruling period from 2002 to 2012, it can be said that 
Turkey was meeting, to a satisfactory degree, the criteria mentioned in the above analysis as well 




Fig 5. During the AKP ruling period from 2002 to 2012, it can be said that Turkey was meeting, to a 
satisfactory degree, the majority of the Regional Power criteria in discussion (Source: self-author, 
based on template from (SmartSheet, 2017). 
 
During the 2000s, in a rather paradoxical manner, Turkey earned the respect or at least the 
acceptance of Americans, Russians, Iranians and Israelis, while at the same time Europe was 
looking forward to having a special cooperation scheme with Turkey towards its accession to the 
E.U. Additionally many Balkan nations declared themselves to be Turkey’s historical allies, while 
several Caucasian nations pursued cooperation or common politico-economic ground with Turkey. 
The fact is that Turkey was steadily and consistently intervening practically on all neighbouring 
fronts that could conceivably be open in its wider region. 
According to A. Davutoğlu’s various official statements, Turkey’s foreign policy over the first 
AKP decade in power dealt with regional problems, aiming to eradicate problems with its 
neighbours through a balancing, “rhythmic” diplomacy (“zero problems” principle) and worked 
towards the objective that Turkey should be seen, naturally and freely, as the ideal mediator, the 
prime protector and guarantor of normality in the region.  
Passing, however, from the 2002-2012 to the 2012-2017 period, which was marked by the 
absence of A. Davutoğlu’s sophistication and Abdullah Gül’s moderation, Turkish internal and 
external political scene has changed not only in the nature and characteristics of all its criteria and 
components described before, but also in terms of strengths, weaknesses, threats and 
opportunities, as the figure below (Fig. 6 successing Fig. 5) graphically illustrates, highlighting 
Turkey’s main difficulty in bringing its efforts to fruition. Furthermore, both its “multi-faceted and 
outward-looking diplomacy” as well as its excessive “hegemonic mythology” turned from strengths 
to weaknesses, where meddling with the Arab Spring expansion and the Syrian crisis resolution 
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have led to severe military engagements, wastage and squander of resources, while mythology 
encourages superiority complexes and obsessions which, in turn, deprive policies of the realism 




Fig. 6. During the AKP ruling period from 2012 to 2017, it can be verified that the overdose of its 
multi-faceted diplomacy and “hegemonic mythology” tend to turn from strengths to weaknesses 




If the afore-mentioned Regional Power criteria were to be briefly assessed and distinguished 
between “mandatory” and “supportive”, criteria numbered: 1 (Energy sufficiency), 2 (Economic 
growth), 3 (Strategic armaments) and 6 (Favourable international relations) would be rated as 
mandatory (sine qua non) in the process and, more so, in maintaining a cutting-edge and long-term 
regional leadership, while criteria numbered 4 (Geopolitically critical position), 5 (Leadership) and 7 
(Social Cohesion) would probably be rated as merely supportive for every regional power. 
The above analysis certainly leads to conclusions with respect to the success, or the 
possibilities of success, of Turkey’s foreign policy in fulfilling its objective not only to emerge but 
also to be established as a regional power. Such conclusions can be quantitatively justified in a 
further research on the basis of percentage/numerical estimates for the assessed performances per 
criterion. It is also a pre-requisite that the review of a country’s candidacy for becoming a regional 
power is related to the competition that may be prevalent in a particular geopolitical region among 
several countries claiming the same or antagonistic leading role. This, surely, depends on the 
geopolitical circumstances prevailing each time, “how many leaders a kingdom can sustain”; in 
other words, how many regional powers and what distribution of power among them may lead the 
particular geopolitical region to balance and stability. Focusing on the Eastern Mediterranean and 
Middle East regions, it is noted that Turkey is not the only suitor of leadership. Traditionally, Israel 
has been a leading figure in the region and it could certainly be the object of a similar study that 
would review the verification of the criteria under consideration insofar as Israel is concerned. 
Another challenging suitor of the particular “leadership” is Iran which may also score a 
satisfactory number of points based on the scale of the criteria under consideration, particularly if 
ever acquire nuclear power for military purposes. Such list could be further extended if, for instance, 
Egypt’s influence in the Middle East and the Greater Maghreb is taken into consideration. Based on 
this premise, it would be interesting to know the answer to the question if and to what extent mainly 
Israel and Iran, each country for its own reasons, will try and manage to harness Turkish 
aspirations. 
Last but not least, we have clearly identified and assessed a rift between the first ten years 
and the follow up five latest of AKP ruling. Actually, it is a progressive transition carrying though 
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extremely dynamic and revisionary characteristics. The study’s title emphasise on the dilemmatic 
question, is the Turkish regime transformation a pilot for other states in this heavily turmoil area? 
The answer if Turkey is an example or a counterexample with a negative connotation, refuting the 
powerful expectations, is definitely related with the way the transformation itself is being developed; 
there are strong evidences that, despite the initial reasonable potential for democracy, progress and 
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